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Producing power
Army was built for a campaign, not a battle
This is the second volume of Russel Beatie's extended history of the Army
of the Potomac, and it covers the period from the aftermath of tactical defeat at
Bull Run (First Manassas) to preparation for strategic defeat in the Seven Days
Battle. The theme of this volume is building an effective army to defend
Washington and move toward Richmond, something that Union Secretary of
War Simon Cameron, commanding general Winfield Scott, and army
commander Irvin McDowell, had failed to do before giving battle at Bull Run on
July 21, 1861. The central figure in this immense administrative, logistical,
training, and organizational task was George B. McClellan, appointed to
command the Army of the Potomac after Bull Run and made general in chief in
November, 1861.
When he assumed command of the Army of the Potomac at the end of July,
1861, McClellan saw first hand the wretched condition of the alleged army that
McDowell had led south to defeat. There were virtually no defense works for
Washington, the troop units were disorganized, untrained, and ill-equipped, and
both officers and men appeared drunk on the streets of Washington. In his first
volume, The Army of the Potomac: Birth of Command, November
1860-September 1861, (2002), Beatie described the command McClellan had
inherited in the aftermath of Bull Run:Everything was in chaos. He did not see
troops in military position. No avenue of approach was guarded. No regiment
was properly encamped. The number of troops was insufficient. Their quality
was low. The period of service of many regiments had expired or was about to
expire. Men and officers left their camps at will (417-418).
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It would have been hard to argue with any of that in July, 1861.
While there was plenty of experience in dealing with each of these problems
on a small scale, there was none on doing them all in a big way and all at once.
McClellan had to create an effective army from the rubble of chaos, defeat, and
demoralization. He had to supply, train, and equip that army, and then lead it to
victory over the rebels (the designation Confederate has become politically
incorrect). These tasks were, in their nature, quite different; perhaps, by the Civil
War, so different that it would be hard to find one man who could do them all
well enough to win the war. Nevertheless, the young Maj. Gen. George B.
McClellan was still expected to do them all, and he did the first two well and
quickly. He was reluctant to lead his army south until he felt it was ready.
Visible progress in organization, supply, equipment, and fortification of
Washington contrasted with an absence of offensive activity. The great
expectations that had accompanied McClellan to Washington gradually turned to
criticism.
The army that McClellan set about building suffered from three primary
difficulties, the first being supply, equipment, and training, the second involving
command in the field and strategic direction in general, and the third concerning
different political views of the general war aims. These difficulties were not
insurmountable, but they were susceptible to essentially different modes of
success and moments of proof. The new army demonstrated by its presence in
defense of Washington that the mob of May-June, 1861, had been replaced by
organization and discipline. Command would appear only in the test of battle,
where the good and lucky officers would emerge. War aims would emerge from
military circumstance and political discussion, though Congressional and local
support for favored generals and campaigns continued always. The major part of
Beatie's superb book describes McClellan's efforts to deal with the growing
political demands to move south, engage the rebels and end slavery, all
increasing as the larger and better supplied and equipped army seemed,
simultaneously, both stronger than the southern forces and unwilling to fight.
Archimedes noted that large numbers were different from small numbers, a
profound truth in administration as well as mathematics. This truth was applied
to the emerging Army of the Potomac by Lincoln's Attorney General, Edward
Bates, who confided to his diary on December 31, 1861, that none of the Union
generals had any personal knowledge of the complicated movements of a great
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army. He might well have added that organizing, equipping, and supplying a
great army were also tasks of unknown, but clearly immense, proportions.
Fortunately for the United States, Edwin Stanton, who replaced Simon Cameron
at the War Department on January 13, 1862, had as clear a grasp as his cabinet
colleague Bates on the nature of numbers. He wrote Charles A. Dana on
February 1, 1862, that to manage an army of 500,000 with the machinery
adapted to a peace establishment of 12,000 is no easy task. It was, however, a
task that Stanton and Quartermaster general Montgomery Meigs could and did
accomplish.
Letting contracts, buying and storing ordinance, transport and supply,
keeping the books; these may have required miracles of administration work, but
they turned out to be easy tasks. Finding the right officers to command the
unprecedented large numbers of troops proved to be a much harder job, as
personnel management always is. Beatie's book is particularly strong when
examining the command problems facing Lincoln, Cameron and Stanton, and
McClellan. Absent a major battle, when trial by fire would indicate who could
exercise combat command, McClellan had to guess who ought to hold major line
commands. Since McClellan wished to avoid even small battles until the army
was ready, there were bound to be disappointments when the time finally came.
Beatie describes the various manpower pools from which the officers came,
including politics, the regular army, and the veterans of Bull Run. The most
important, however, would be the Illinois shopkeeper pool, though, of course,
McClellan could not have known of that.
A continuing and serious problem, intractable over the short hand and
insolvable over the long, was the interplay of politics and military affairs. Beatie
places the military/political interface in both the smaller context of states and
politicians supporting favorite sons and the larger context of the issue of slavery.
This dual focus gives the book a great deal of its exceptional value, making
Army of the Potomac not a military history but a history of the military and its
place in a democratic government and society in political and moral crisis.
Beatie insists that the issue of abolition affected military personnel and tactical
decisions from before the start of the war, (in Volume I), and during the creating
of the army in 1861, (in Volume I and II), and in the preparation for the advance
into Virginia (one hopes there will be a Volume III, and beyond).
George McClellan's creation of the Army of the Potomac in the months
between Bull Run and the Seven Days Battle may be understood as the
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2005
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beginning of the modern American way of war. In 1861-1862, just as in
1917-1918 and 1942-1943, American organizational skills, honed in church and
government, in industry and transportation, produced a huge and victorious army
more or less out of nothing, and kept it supplied with an efficiency that
overwhelmed opponents and would later astound allies. Union mechanical skills,
developed in commerce and industry, made McClellan's army technologically
superior to its foe, and the gap between the two sides widened as the war went
on. At Bull Run in 1861, the Union forces may have been variously and
inadequately equipped, but those deficiencies disappeared quickly. No one in the
Union civilian or military command structure doubted for a moment the need for
a huge and modern army, including its logistical tail and organizational
superstructure. This may have been unprecedented in the national memory and
experience, but it was constructed anyway, and became the model for future
American military organization.
At the time, generals and politicians thought they were creating an army for
an immense and decisive battle, an enlarged and successful vision of Bull Run,
which would decide the war. Certainly McClellan shared this vision of the future
as he looked toward a major Union victory that would lead to the capture of
Richmond and the end of the war. But he built an army designed for a campaign,
not a battle, for closing with the other side for an extended period, not a day.
Grant would take advantage of that army, inherited from generals who lost to
Robert E. Lee more often than they won, while the army had campaigned on,
surviving inadequate tactical command. That army was McClellan's creation.
Whatever the generals and politicians were doing, they could not do it
behind close doors. Constant and often critical publicity is a further hallmark of
the American way of war. Beatie covers it superbly. The Army of the Potomac
was so close to Washington, the Willard Hotel, the telegraph office, and the
railroad that reporters could visit units, return in a single day, gather in the
Willard to pick up political gossip, get a story on the wire or the night train, and
then return to the army the next day and repeat the process. Every bit of news,
true or not, made it to the papers, often before the officers and men heard it.
There were no secrets, military or otherwise, and though it bothered McClellan
greatly, there was little he could do. It offended his sense of decorum, but it was
war in the American way. As they used to say in World War II, the war was in
all the papers.
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In these several volumes, Russel Beatie is functioning as the biographer of
the Army of the Potomac, but neither as a soldier's story of individuals nor as a
study of generals and problems of command. The Army of the Potomac as an
organization evolving over time is less well-known than are its leaders, who,
until Grant and Meade, came and went usually in defeat. But the Army of the
Potomac fought on through the horrors of combat, the boredom of cantonment,
and the discomforts of military life, gradually getting better in the arts and
mysteries of the soldierly craft, so that from defeat the army survived and
ultimately prevailed. The picture Beatie has drawn of the Army of the Potomac
is the reverse image of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, where great
commanders compensated for a lack of modern artillery, engineering, and
logistics, while the more modern and efficient Army of the Potomac overcame
failure of command until Lincoln could find Grant. Beatie has presented a
sweeping vision, presenting the eastern campaigns, commanders, battles, and
army both in detail and as a whole. The two extant volumes are a major
achievement of historical scholarship, and we await the rest of what will be the
standard study of the Army of the Potomac.
James D. Hardy, Jr. is a professor of history at Louisiana State University
and has published several books on both history and literature, including one on
baseball.
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